We investigate the relationship between low-level incidents of political violence and communication patterns seven months after the 2012 Ivorian Civil War using network traffic from all of Orange Telecom's Côte d'Ivoire cell towers and 500,000 randomly sampled cell phone subscribers. We first show that in the days preceding small violent incidents, mobile phone call volumes increase by 10% and the number of cell phones that are active increases by 6%, while the length of average calls decreases by 4%. These unique communication patterns attenuate as the distance from violence increase and strengthen when incidents with no fatalities are excluded. We then use machine learning techniques to explore whether these changes can predict the day of violent events at the cell tower level. The addition of cell phone data to base models appear to improve our ability to predict violent events at very fine spatial and temporal resolution.
Introduction
Does communication behavior change immediately before and after violence? Intuitively, we almost certainly believe so. Whether it is general chatter surrounding rising tensions, plotters conspiring, victims calling for help, confused onlookers searching for understanding, or relatives calling to check on their loved ones afterwards, the behavior of people in proximity to violence is likely different from their behavior in general. Interestingly, even though there is plenty of research on the effect of trauma and violence on behavior in the long run, 1 there is little empirical social science evidence on behavior immediately before and after violence. This information is important because it may reveal whether local residents had picked up signals of brewing trouble or if they were caught off guard. The former, in particular, is especially interesting since it leads to the possibility that dispersed information can be aggregated to predict the likelihood of violence in the immediate future.
The paucity of empirical evidence may be due to the difficulty of timing data collection to coincide with violent events. This paper investigates whether the ubiquitousness of cellular phones solves this problem. Even in the most remote corners of developing countries individuals use cellphones in ways that would have been unimaginable even a decade ago. Citizens' dependence on phones to make their daily lives work results in call patterns that reflect the rhythm and pulse of a community. Cellphones provide a continuous stream of data, where aberrations provide insight into how citizens are affected by events. Sudden changes are clues that daily life is disrupted. This is true both when it is expensive to survey the population (e.g. citizens in remote places in developing countries) or when one wouldn't realize that a survey might be interesting (e.g. before a major event occurs). One out of every three people in the African continent owns a cellphone (UNCTAD (2014)) and users' behavior generates a vast quantity of data on what people are doing and what they might be thinking both after and before externally unexpected events occur. This is true both in situations where it is expensive to survey the population (e.g. citizens in remote places in developing countries) or when one would not realize that a survey might be interesting (e.g. before a major event occurs). Here, we combine high frequency phone data with United Nations data on violence in Côte d'Ivoire. As far as we are aware, this is the first large scale analysis in the social sciences of real-time communications usage surrounding violent incidents.
We ask several questions. First, are these violent incidents anticipated? If so, mobile activity would reflect pre-incident chatter. Conversely, changes that occur only after incidents suggest that violence was a surprise. Second, is the impact of violence intensely focused on a few or is it widely dispersed? Third, do call characteristics reflect urgency? This may reveal itself as short, price/time insensitive calls to friends and families or as movement of phone subscribers away from the affected areas. are a problem across the country. We find that daily call volume increases by 9.7-14.1% in the runup to violence and that this change decreases in significance and magnitude after the event. This increase is driven by a widespread increase in phone usage instead of a large spike from a small number of subscribers. Pre-incident call characteristics are consistent with urgency: calls between phones that share the same provider (in-network calls) increase faster (14.7-19.2%) than general calls and are on average 3-5% shorter than calls in normal times. The anomalous communication patterns attenuate as the distance from violence increases and strengthen when incidents with no fatalities are excluded.
Given the possibility that there is a pre-violence mobile communication signature, we turn our attention towards using recent local cellphone activity to predict violence several days in advance.
We first attempt to do this at the antenna tower-day level before settling at the antenna tower-week level due to the concentration of violence on certain days of the week. This is an extremely high resolution considering that most previous prediction attempts have been at the country level and the finest resolution has been at the municipality-month level. Weidmann & Ward (2010) We find that,
relative to a base model that predicts future violence as a function of past violence, the addition of cellphone data can improve out-of-sample prediction quality by more than 50%.
The second part of our analysis provides the first attempt to aggregate signals contained in mobile phone usage to predict violence at a highly localized daily basis. Predicting political violence has long been a challenge for the social sciences. The largest part of this literature, exemplified by Collier & Hoeffler (1998) and Laitin & Fearon (2003) , derive theoretical predictions about which sorts of countries are likely to experience civil wars and test them with time-series-cross-section regressions. This literature mostly concerns slow-changing or time-invariant variables, answering the question "Which countries are likely to be violent?" It has moved to explain the geographically fine-grained question of which places within countries are most likely to experience violence.
However, little progress has been made towards the temporally fine-grained question "On which specific day will violence occur there?" We directly address this question. Weidmann & Ward (2010) is the highest-resolution within-country violence prediction in the literature. The authors use a set of time-invariant local characteristics and both spatial and temporal lags of conflict to make region/month level predictions during the Bosnian civil war. This parsimonious model is highly effective at predicting conflict at the monthly level in the high-conflict environment of that civil war. 3 Our work here is a natural next step from that paper. We also use machine learning techniques to predict violence, but the nature of our data allows us to increase both the temporal and spatial resolution greatly. Relative to a base model that predicts future violence to be a function of violence frequency in the training set, using cellphone patterns improves the accuracy of prediction by nearly 50%. They compare results from several machine learning techniques that are capable of predicting the locations of nearly 70% of the violent events in the 249 villages they surveyed. 5 Readers interested in an in-depth treatment of the war are referred to McGovern (2011) . 6 The last census was in 1998.
translates to about three phones for every four Ivorians.
What sort of selection bias do we get in Côte d'Ivoire by using mobile phone data instead of survey data intentionally designed to be a representative sample? Aker & Mbiti (2010) look across Africa and conclude that while the initial adoption of cellphones was concentrated in the male urban middle class, this wealth and urbanization bias has disappeared. Further, Gillwald et al. (2010) show that by 2008 the gender gap in Ivorian phone ownership had become insignificant.
We find no evidence of systematic differences in pricing policy or subscriber base between the multiple mobile providers that operate in Côte d'Ivoire. Since calls between two SIM cards from the same provider (within-network calls) are cheaper than other calls, individuals with phones own on average 1.96 SIM cards (GSMA Intelligence (2012) ) and switch between cards in order to minimize cross-network calling. Several aspects of the immediate post-war environment may amplify the sensitivity of day-to-day communication to incipient violence. First, the post-war environment could cause people to be more responsive to possible signs of violence than at other times. 7 Second, lingering internal displacement from the civil war could cause people to be more distant from family than in normal times, causing them to substitute telephone use for face-to-face communication. Using a case where the signal is at its strongest might normally raise questions of external validity since it is easier to detect even a very small effect. We address this concern in two ways: by excluding the first month of data (when elections were held and most of the violence occurred) from our regression, and second, by using regressions trained only on mid-2012 violence to predict violence in 2011. However, these efforts are imperfect, and ultimately we believe that for this first attempt to relate real time cellular activity to small scale violence, any possible magnification of the effect is a feature.
7 Post-conflict situations are tenser in general (e.g. Hartzell & Hoddie (2003) ). However, it is also possible that people become inured to conflict and therefore respond less to it. This would bias against our findings so we will not be concerned about this any further.
Data

Violence data
The most complete information about violence in Côte d'Ivoire during this period is the weekly reports from the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Iviore (UNOCI).
8 "ONUCI hebdo" (UN-OCI weekly) focuses on the actions and concerns of the UN peacekeeping mission; this effectively filters for political violence. Countering concerns that the UN avoids the most violent areas, thus undercounting in key areas, Ruggeri et al. (2011) show that UN peacekeepers focus on areas where the conflict has been historically most explosive. They also demonstrate that the UN provides significantly more uniform coverage than newspaper reports, especially the foreign press who frequently focuses on the capital and large cities.
We code all cases of actual and implied 9 violence in UNOCI weekly from December 2011 to is an order of magnitude larger than other cities in the country, but is treated only as a single subprefecture in this dataset. 13 Since it is much easier to be unaware of tensions in a different district of a city of millions than in a different part of a village of thousands, we believe that physical distance to events impacts people differently in a rural subprefecture than in Abidjan.
We generate three other variables from this dataset of 400 million calls. The first, All Calls, is the total number of calls from a given subprefecture on a given day. The second, Active Subscribers, is the number of different phones which register at least one call on a given day. We work with both these variables and their logged counterparts. We also generate a measure of mobility, Moving in, which reflects the daily net flow of phones into each subprefecture. First, we define the location of a subscriber on date t as the subprefecture where she made her last timestamped call of the day. If a subscriber makes no calls, her location is defined to be the same as the previous day.
For date t and subprefecture s, M oving in s,t is calculated as the difference between the number of subscribers assigned to location s on dates t and t − 1 -in other words, the number of net new 11 It is important to note that in this case a subscriber is a specific Orange SIM card. If someone owns two SIMs and switches between them depending on who she is calling, we only observe calls from the Orange SIM. Similarly, if they give, lend, or sell their phone to someone else who makes calls from it, we observe only one subscriber. 12 In the analysis, we will vary distances to 0.25 • , 0.75 • , and 1.0
• . We will also vary the precision of the recorded event date and the intensity of the event (fatal or not). 13 The largest city not part of Abidjan is Bouaké, the North's largest city with a population of 650,000. No other cities have populations over 215,000. subscribers who moved into a subprefecture on date t.
[ 14 We collapse this to the day level in order to match the temporal resolution of our violence data. To connect the UNOCI data and the antenna data, for each antenna i and date t, we define a binary variable V it which is 1 if a violent incident occurred within 0.5
• (35 miles) of antenna i on that date.
We define three additional variables from this dataset. The first, In-network Calls, is the total number of calls made from a given antenna on a given day. Second, Call Duration is the average length of calls on a given day. Finally, Daytime Call % is the fraction of calls in a day made between 8 am and 5 pm. gesting that there is no correlation between violence and antenna location. Comparing effect sizes across the two datasets requires care. The subscriber data represent all calls made by 500,000 random Orange subscribers. This is roughly one out of every eight Orange subscribers and one out of every sixteen mobile subscribers in Côte d'Ivorie. Generalizing from the antenna data is less straightforward. Orange has approximately a 25% market share, which means we may expect approximately 25% * 25% = 6.25% of calls to be between two Orange towers. However, this direct scaling is questionable because within-network calls are much cheaper than between-network calls and hence, likely to make up a larger portion of overall calls. 15 Further, we do not capture calls which connect to non-Orange operated towers. We currently do not know what percentage of
Orange calls involve non-Orange towers.
These two datasets provide complementary perspectives on calling patterns. The subscriber data demonstrates how individual callers change their calling patterns in response to violence. We can separate the intensity of calls from individual subscribers from the overall volume of calls coming from a subprefecture. This hints at whether changes in calls come from the intensive margin (e.g increased call frequency from active subscribers) or the extensive margin (e.g new activity from otherwise passive subscribers). However, it covers only about 12% of Orange subscribers.
The antenna dataset captures all Orange-to-Orange calls. It contains average call durations, which may provide an indication of the function of the calls. 16 Finally, given its finer spatial resolution, the antenna data may be more suited for examining the comparative statics of change in calls given distance to violence.
This section explores whether communication patterns change before, during, or after a violent incident. First we consider estimation strategies. Then we demonstrate changes in communication patterns ahead of incidents.
Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
We investigate several questions. We first ask whether violent events surprise people in affected areas. If so, we expect no change in calling activity before violence, but expect changes afterwards in response to violence. Conversely, if locals feel tension, activity could change before violence.
Our second question concerns whether any changes in activity due to violence are widespread.
The subscriber data permits changes in the number of Active Subscribers to be distinguished from changes in the number of All Calls. Changes in overall call volumes due to small changes from a large number of subscribers suggest that knowledge or impact of violence is widespread. Changes concentrated in a few outlier phones would suggest a small number of highly informed or impacted people.
Our third question concerns a change in the nature of calls. During rising tensions, calls may become more urgent. This could manifest itself in many ways: calls may be shorter or callers less sensitive to business hours or prices. The day/night balance of calls could shift or more calls could be of out-of-network. Alternatively, people experiencing danger may call family and friends more, increasing the proportion of within-network calls. We therefore utilize the three variables from the antenna data, (In-network Calls, Call Duration, Daytime Call %), for this question. Last, we investigate changes in mobility. Knowledge of impending violence might cause subscribers to leave potentially dangerous places and to return later after the incident happens. We examine
Moving in for clues of temporary displacement.
The call variables discussed above are the dependent variables. The data are nested both in time and space. Antennas, indexed by i, are nested in subprefectures, indexed by s, which are further nested in region, r. Similarly, days are indexed t, and are nested in days-of-the-week (e.g Monday, Tuesday), w. We subscript variables with the finest level at which they vary. 17 Callrelated variables on day t are thus c it or c st , depending on whether we are working at the antenna i or subprefecture s level.
It is initially plausible that the correct specification includes a lagged dependent variable rather than a static model with fixed effects. To check for this, we first looked at the within-unit autocorrelation of the call variables and test for unit root. We find no higher order autocorrelation and the Dickey Fuller test rejects the null of a unit root convincingly. 18 Alternative specifications with lagged dependent variables and with time trends as well as regional time trends are available from the authors upon request. We therefore proceed in this section with a core specification of ordinary least squares with two-way fixed effects with standard error clustered on the geographical units in Eq 1 and Eq 2 below.
Our main independent variables are V To determine the optimal number of leads and lags (−L, +L) for the main independent variables, V D it and V D st , we start by considering an eight day window (−8, +8) around the violence and then shrink the window one day at a time. For each specification we then test the joint hypothesis that there is no change in the coefficient more than n days before the violence. 19 For leads of more than 4 days, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly 0 in 9 of the 10 tests. However, once we include the fourth lead it becomes hard to reject the null. Therefore in the regression tables that follow we will use a constant 4 day window around events.
In considering controls for time, we take into account several facts about Côte d'Ivoire. First, violence is concentrated on certain days of the week. Second, certain days of the year experience shocks common to the entire country (e.g, Election Day, African Cup, holidays). Third, observances like Christmas are more important event in the Christian south than the more Muslim north.
We therefore use day-region fixed effects, δ rt , which are day dummies interacted with region dummies. They account for regular weekly patterns in addition to shocks common to the entire country while allowing individuals in the two regions to respond differently to events. Time-invariant characteristics of the units (e.g. area) are captured by the unit fixed effects, α i or α s , which also implicitly control for slow-changing correlates of phone use, such as population density. 
Results
Behavior changes in proximity to violence. Using the two data sets separately (Tables 2 and 3) , we find strong evidence of communication changes before incidents of violence and weaker evidence of changes afterward. The two datasets are combined in a single regression in Table 4 to explore 19 We shrink the window down to (−3, +3) and jointly test the coefficient for n = to 3. Concerns about multicollinearity should be assuaged given that removing variables in the restricted model leaves the remaining coefficients and standard errors almost untouched. Tables are available upon request. 20 Official population estimates far predate the civil wars: the last census was conducted in 1998. the mechanism behind these changes. Robustness tests are conducted in Tables 5, Table 6, and   Table 7 by varying the distance to violence, the incident intensity, and subsets of data. Table 7 also includes alternative econometric specifications and provides a gateway to the models used in Section 5. Figure 2 Panel A for call volume changes before and after incidents. 22 Assuming that we have a random sample of the 8 million cell subscribers, this is equivalent to 18 − 30 thousand additional daily calls leading up to a violent incident.
(25.6%) before attenuating after the violence (7.18%). Column 3 shows that the duration of calls decreases by 4.9 to 8.2 seconds before violent incidents. Since average calls are 137 seconds long, this corresponds to a 3-5% decrease in duration (Column 4). 23 Column 5 checks whether the timing of calls shifts in proximity to violence. There are more night time calls on D = {−3, 3} and more day time calls on D = {−1, 0, 1}, but these coefficients are extremely small in magnitude.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] Table 4 utilizes variables from both datasets to understand the mechanism behind these changes.
Column 1 introduces a control for the number of active subscribers into the specification from Table   2 Column 1. We see that each active subscriber makes approximately 15 calls per day. Contingent on this, there is no additional increase in volume of calls due to violence. Switching to a logged specification does not substantively affect the results (Column 2). However, Column 3 shows that even accounting for active subscribers, there are increases in in-network calls ranging from 7.3% to 11.7% before violence to a peak of 13.3% on the day of violence. This increase holds even when we account for the total call volumes in each subprefecture (Column 4). This behavior suggests that calls are shifting to those with whom one shares a mobile provider.
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In Column 5 and 6, we investigate whether shorter call duration can be explained by physical limitations in communications infrastructure as opposed to behavioral changes. Though coverage is generally good across the country, higher utilization (such as due to more active subscribers or larger volume of calls) can overcrowd networks causing dropped calls. The last two columns of the table show that, consistent with expectations, higher utilization is associated with shorter calls.
However, the decreased call length is more than what can be explained by network congestion.
Overall, the behavior appears consistent with citizens shifting their mobile usage towards urgent calls to close friends and family in anticipation of future violence (and due to the immediate experience of violence). Interestingly, Columns 3-6 appear to show that the largest magnitude of pre-incident changes appear to occur two days before the incident.
[ [ . In Column 1, we expand our coding of violence to include violent events whose exact dates are uncertain.
The magnitude of the effect of violence is lessened and spread out over more dates, as expected from the addition of events with dates measured with random error. In Column 2, we return to our core specification, considering all violent events, both fatal and non-fatal, where the date is measured precisely. Column 3 only includes fatal events, whether or not we are certain of their exact date. The magnitude of the effects is significantly larger, which makes sense if people react more strongly to the sorts of situations which can lead to fatal events. Column 4 shows that by restricting the sample to fatal events with precise dates the magnitudes of the events are the largest. Again, columns 5-8 show that results are similar using number of active subscribers as the dependent variable.
[ It is important to remember that there are day-region fixed effects, which will pick up any common increases in the independent variables on Sundays or around the election (which are just a combination of individual region-days) but this may not be sufficient. In Table 7 we can see that the correlations between violence and call length are not dependent on any particular modeling assumption.
Since violence is heavily concentrated on Sundays (partially due to the election on Sunday, December 11, 2011), it is worthwhile to check whether results are robust to the exclusion of those dates. Column 1 is a reminder of the shortening of calls around violence. Column 2 shows that even when excluding the weeks before and after the election (thus accounting for both prospective and retrospective effects of the election) calls are significantly shorter before violence. While there is a vibrant literature on election violence in particular, this suggests that election and non-election violence have similar cellphone signatures. Violence is sufficiently uncommon that excluding these dates also excludes all cases of multiple violent events occurring in the same location but on different days within the same 2-week period. 25 Column 3 excludes Sundays from the regression, but not the leads or lags of events which occurred on them. 26 . Nothing substantively changes.
Next, Column 4 removes all events which occurred on Sundays from the dataset. 27 Again, there is a (statistically and substantively) significant decrease in the length of calls, despite cutting the effective number of violent incidents in half.
Column 5 and 6 consider whether our fixed-effect strategy is over-ambitious. It also transitions into the family of models we can implement in the prediction section. Since each of the models here can be thought of as a restriction on our base model, the bottom row of each of these columns tests the restriction imposed against the baseline model. 28 In Column 5, we replace the day-region 25 We are less concerned with multiple nearby events on the same day, as an individual near two events is certainly near one. 26 We create an interrupted panel with no seventh day. 27 We recode all violent events on Sundays as being peaceful. We then generate leads and lags of the remaining, non-Sunday, events.
28 F-tests always prefer the substantively similar larger models in our core specification.
fixed effects with day of the week effects. Column 6 replaces the unit fixed effects in Column 5 with Prior Violence, which counts the number of incidents near the unit for the first three weeks of the data. In sum, the general result of shortening calls before violence persists both through changes in the fixed effect strategies and through excluding various subsets of the data.
[ 
Prediction
In the previous section, we found that cellphone use appears to change in proximity to violence. A few days before an incident, more subscribers are making calls, driving up call volumes. The calls appear to be shorter and to be between phones that share the same provider. This section explores whether these changes can be aggregated to predict violent incidents a few days in advance.
We predict at the antenna level rather than the subprefecture level due to its finer resolution.
To avoid potential selection bias due to correlation between data availability and incidents, we only consider antennas for which we record at least 140 days of cellphone use, retaining 658 antenna (representing 208 of Côte d'Ivoire's 258 subprefectures) in the final prediction dataset.
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Our dependent variable is V it , the main independent variable from the previous section, which is 1 if UNOCI records a violent incident within 0.5 • (about 50 km) of antenna i on date t, and 0 otherwise. It is important to note that since we are not attempting to make causal inferences about the relationship between calls and violence there is not a "correct" direction for the regression.
We follow the convention in the prediction literature: we perform in-sample and out-of-sample prediction and then evaluate our results using Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curves.
The ROC plots the performance of a prediction model for all possible thresholds where predicted probabilities can be classified as positive. With the y-axis illustrating the rate of true pos- 29 Since we are engaged in prediction rather than estimation of structural parameters, the loss of several subprefectures does not lead to bias, but rather raises external validity concerns in the sparsest subprefectures. Studies of prediction market have found that the thinner the market is (i.e, the fewer subscribers there are), the less accurate aggregation can be (Healy et al. (2010) ). itives (sensitivity) and x-axis the rate of false positives (1−specificity), a higher ROC curve indicates better prediction. The AUC (Area Under the Curve) provides a numerical measure, with 0.5 being equivalent to a random guess.
30 Table 8 summarizes the AUC for all the models we test in this section.
In-sample Prediction
In-sample prediction consists of performing a logistic regression on the entire dataset and examining the extent to which adding phone data improves the fit. We generate the baseline model by regressing V it against region and day-of-week fixed effects.
This baseline model does well picking up the propensity of regions and days for violence when tested in-sample. We can visually see the ROC curve by observing Panel A of Figure 3 ; it is high above the diagonal, which suggests that regions and days are highly predictive of violence for insample prediction. The AUC is 0.7073 (Row 1 of Table 8 ). Note also that the curve is made up of line segments, which suggest that a small number of fixed effects is doing all the work.
We then add cellphone information as follows. Vector C it contains variables that were the dependent variables in the regressions in Section 4.2: In-network call length, Day Call Percent, Innetwork Calls, Active Subscribers, Moving in, and All Calls. Our first models include only a single day of cell data (L1 = L2 = {0, −1, −2, −3, −4}). We then include all four days of lagged data (L1 = −1 and L2 = −4). Finally, we allow the choice of regressors to be performed through a machine learning technique called cross-validation. The technique divides the training set data into several subsets, fits a model on each subset and tests it on the rest of the data. Models with more 30 Assigning all observations to be either positive or negative will also produce an AUC of 0.5. AUC is superior to percent correctly predicted, as the former is a measure of how much predictions can be improved beyond always guessing the modal outcome, while the latter is, in the case of rare events, mostly a measure of how common the modal event is.
terms are penalized to avoid over-fitting. 31 While we begin with all four lags of all the cellphone variables as predictors, cross-validation drops variables with little marginal predictive power. We refer interested readers to an overview for social scientists in Varian (2009) or a full treatment in Hastie et al. (2009) .
Panel B of Figure 3 shows that same-day cell data (day 0) smoothes the ROC curve out, but improves prediction only a little (AUC= 0.7240, a 2.3% improvement). Adding day -1, -2, -3, and -4 cell data separately does not improve performance (with AUC ranging from 0.6246 to 0.7323) and adding them all together actually hurts prediction due to over-fitting (AUC=0.6962). However, using cross-validation to choose among available predictors using all day -1 to -4 cell data improves performance substantially (AUC=0.8021, a 13.4% increase over baseline).
Recalling that Sundays and Mondays are by far the most violent days of the week and therefore contain most of the actual events, we therefore focus our prediction question to "Which Sunday or
Monday, and where, will violence happen?" Now we observe in Panel A of Figure 4 that day and region fixed effects no longer have as much predictive power. The baseline model now has an AUC of 0.6744, while the model with current day cell data improves in-sample detection to 0.7647 and the model with recent past cell data further improves prediction to 0.8121 (Table 8 row 2) . This is a 20.4% improvement over the baseline model. The cross-validated model produces a ROC of 0.8699 (29% over baseline).
Out of Sample Prediction
We now move on to the more interesting problem of out-of-sample prediction. We divide our data into training and test sets. We run the regression on violence and cellphone data in the training set and use those coefficients to predict probability of violence using only cellphone data from the test sets. Test sets are always all dates not in the training set. 32 In order to ensure that any results we find are not artifacts of the specific choice we make here, we consider four different divisions. Our first training set contains all the observations from the first 30 days of cellphone usage (Day 1-30 ).
Due to the presence of election violence in the first week, this comprises 573 out of the total 1160
incidents of violence at the antenna-day level. 33 To check that election violence is not driving our results, our second division of the dataset shifts the training set to the second through sixth weeks of observations (Day 14-44). Finally, we investigate whether earlier periods, which are closer to civil war, evidence a stronger signal-to-noise ratio (e.g due to heightened sensitivity to violence) not apparent in later periods. We therefore use the last month (Day 61-91), and all but the first two months, as a training set (day 61-141) since violence was very infrequent after the first two months. Table 8 Columns 2 and 3 show the number of training and test set units used in each split.
By varying both the timing and length of training periods, we are further confident that we are not simply observing an artifact of our choice of training period.
Because of the rarity of violent events, day and subprefecture fixed effects in the training set cause a large number of observations to be dropped. We therefore compute an additional predictor for the test set. P reviousV iolence i is the number of violent events that occurred at unit i during the time span of the training set. 34 Switching to a baseline model using P reviousV iolence i instead of fixed effects allows us to retain these observations. Note that while we can only use periods where violence occurs as training data, it is vital to include any periods of no violence in the test data to check whether the model correctly forecasts no violence when none occurs. 33 Remember that a single violent incident is close to many antennas. 34 It does not make sense to include this in in-sample prediction, as doing so would effectively shift the question: "Given that violence occurs a certain number of times in a given location, on which days does it occur?" known violence (i.e., no cellphone-based predictors) near an antenna i. What can cellphone data do to improve upon this baseline? The econometric equation for the cellphone model is a slight modification of Eq 5. show results from models that add to the baseline model cellphone predictors from day 0 (current day detection), 2 days prior, and 4 days prior, respectively.
While current day cell data only weakly improves prediction in three out of our four out-of-sample prediction problems, the performance of models using cellphone predictors from 2 and 4 days prior improves over the baseline performance significantly and gave steadily decent prediction regardless of the choice of training set. For instance, out-of-sample prediction using day -2 call data results in AUC of 0.6619, 0.6217, 0.6476, and 0.7324 for training set of day 1-30, day 14-44, day 61-91, and day 61-141. These are improvements of 6.1%, 15.6%, 15.7%, and 46.9%. Adding all four days of lags (Column 8) does not improve prediction relative to adding single days of lags, and in the case of low frequency violence, appear to result in over-fitting to data from the training set that hurts the performance of the model in the test set. Using cross-validation to choose the regressors appears to reduce over-fitting and results in significant improvement over the baseline in three out of four of our test cases, but also does not improve prediction over single days of lags.
We can again observe this visually in Figure 5 , which presents the specifications in the final row of Table 8 . Panel A confirms the limited ability of the training violence to predict test violence as the ROC curve hugs the 45
• line. Panel B shows two bulges away from the diagonal, suggesting that the cellphones are able to separate the places with the highest chances of violence from those with the lowest chances, but that it does not discriminate well in between. Finally, Panels C and D show the power of cellphone data to predict violence. In both cases there is strong separation from the diagonal, moving close to a sensitivity of 1 around a specificity of 0.5. This means that
cellphones are able to demonstrate that about half of all tower-days have close to a zero chance of violence occurring in the near future.
These predictions perform well independently, and also in comparison with previous work.
Weidmann & Ward (2010) Table 8 the inclusion of cellphone improved AUC from baseline of 0.6238 to 0.6619 with cellphone data (a 6.1% improvement) and at the best from 0.4985 to 0.7324 (a 46.9% improvement). This suggests that the inclusion of cellphone data in a very low information large-scale prediction problem may improve prediction significantly.
The immediate experience of low level political violence among the general population has previously been difficult to study. This is due to many challenges: timing data collection to coincide with incidents of violence, finding a good measure for widespread changes in population behavior, and sampling at adequate spatial and temporal resolution. Widespread adoption of cellphones at even the most remote places has the potential to overcome some of these issues. In what we believe is the first ever analysis of real-time mobile behavior near violence, we find strong evidence that people's behavior changes before incidents of political violence.
We investigate the correlation between cellular communication patterns and violent incidents.
Surprise would manifest as changes during and after incidents; pre-incident tension in the local environment would appear as changes beforehand even if individuals are not consciously aware that violence is imminent. We would expect to see short calls at all hours of the day since urgent calls are likely to be to the point and insensitive to business hours or off-peak pricing.
We find an increase in volume of calls before incidents. This is induced by an increase in the number of subscribers using their phones, suggesting widespread small changes in behavior instead of intense changes among a few. Calls are also shorter. The magnitude of these changes demonstrates comparative statics consistent with being directly related to the violence. They attenuate as we relax our coding of violence to either include areas that are further from the incident or include violent incidents for which the UN is only able to provide approximate dates. The coefficients increase when we tighten our coding to include only incidents with fatalities. In addition, we find that the fraction of within-network calls relative to all calls increases steadily several days before the event, peaking on the day of the incident and slowly decreasing afterward. This is consistent with the behavior in Blumenstock et al. (2010) where mobile contact is directed to friends and families in catastrophes.
These pre-incident changes suggest that cellphone data may fill some gaps in the violence prediction literature, which has traditionally relied on slow-changing variables, such as population, ethnic fractionalization, or geographical features. While the traditional country-year level prediction is clearly valuable for long-term strategic planning, short-term violence prediction at high spatial and temporal resolution would be valuable to actors on the ground who need to react quickly. This sort of real time prediction may allow them to stop or diffuse violence (e.g. local authorities, UN peacekeeping missions, or intelligence units) or avoid being in the middle of violence (e.g. relief agencies and NGOs). Since we hope to take a step towards the development of real-time prediction of violence with maximum portability across countries, we avoid using time-invariant variables. 35 Our model predicts the day and location of violence for about 20,000 antenna/days, while the highest resolution past prediction was performed for 5,000 province/months (Weidmann & Ward (2010) ). Cellphone data improves prediction significantly compared to baseline models using past propensity of a certain day or region to be violent. In our four out-of-sample prediction problems, the addition of cell data improves prediction by 8.9%, 16%, 18%, and 63%. The marginal contribution of cell data is particularly striking when we use data from calmer periods to predict violence at volatile times (such as during elections). This suggests that cell data may be particularly important when we have little information about the likelihood of a day or an area to be violent, and when violence is at a highly disaggregated level. This project leaves several directions for future exploration. The first involves broadening the types of data which could predict violence. One option is other event data. To be most useful, we would need event data with good rural coverage in developing countries, which are traditionally undercovered by the news media. Weather data is one such candidate. It is generally available and consistently collected between countries and has been tied to violent events such as riots (Bohlken & Sergenti (2010) ). Future refinements of the predictive model could be expanded to use them.
Other communications data will be especially valuable. We are particularly excited to compare the predictive value of cellular phone data with that of changes in Internet usage patterns. It is a set of real-time data which segregates people in the same location by wealth level. This may allow aggregation of information dispersed through the two different processes.
Another area for further research would use similar cellular phone data in more varied contexts. 
